On June 22, 2011 at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice at USD, Dr. Necla Tschirgi of the USD School of Peace Studies spoke to VOW about Human Security & Peacebuilding in the Middle East

Dr. Tschirgi has an extensive resume that covers international research, policy analysis, teaching, research management and peacebuilding. A native of Turkey, she has been an in-house consultant with the UN Secretariat in New York, and Vice President of the International Peace Academy. Dr. Tschirgi has strong ties in Egypt. She was an adjunct professor of political science at the American University in Cairo.

Dr. Tschirgi joined us on June 22 for an enlightening lecture, and she answered questions about the current state of the Middle East.

Our sincere thanks to Milburn Line and the IPJ for making this event possible.

Draft Notes for the Presentation, provided by Dr. Necla Tschirgi:

Title:  Human Security and Peacebuilding in the Middle East

Structure:

1. Some academic background to Human Security, R2P
2. A quick review of the situation in the Middle East
3. Some observations about the reasons for the varied international responses to the Arab Spring in different countries
4. Q&A

1. HS and R2P

You might not believe it, but HS is a new concept.  It basically argues that for too long we have defined security in terms of state security and territorial security because we considered the most serious threats to security coming from wars among states.  With the end of the Cold War, the prospect of wars among states decreased radically.  In fact starting in the 1990s, it became clear that the one of the major threat to security comes from INTERNAL conflicts—especially in cases where the state itself is unwilling or unable to protect the security of its citizens.  Thus, the argument was that we need to protect people against domestic rather than external threats to their security.   This seems like a relatively benign and obvious statement but in fact it was quite radical in nature since it shifted the focus of security concerns from states to their citizens and to the full range of issues that threaten human security:  domestic as well as criminal violence, rape, child soldiers, HIV/AIDs, pandemics, poverty, environmental threats, etc.  

2 different definitions of Human Security (drawing from FDR’s Four Freedoms):  Freedom from Want and Freedom from Fear. ….

Until 9/11, human security gained a lot of interest:  The Campaign Against Landmines, the creation of the International Criminal Court, the resolutions related to gender-based violence, the campaign against small arms and light weapons, etc. were all part of the new human security agenda.   (It is important to remember though that after 9/11, the focus again shifted to national security—state centric security.) 

Meanwhile, however, something important happened under the Human Security Framework:  Canadian Govt convened the Int’al Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) which produced the groundbreaking report:  Responsibility to Protect (R2P).  The report argued that in the first instance, it is the responsibility of each state to protect the security of its citizens.  However, if a state is not willing or able to do so, then this creates a responsibility on the International Community to do so on HUMANITARIAN ground.  

The ICISS report came out just after 9/11 and was quietly shelved—especially since the terms “humanitarian intervention” became highly contentious after the US intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq.  But finally at the World Summit in 2005, world leaders unanimously endorsed the principle of R2P.  But the policy/principle was not really tested until the Arab spring.

In teaching HS, I always tell my students:  It is a great concept, but is it implementable?  Who will implement it?  With what tools and instruments?  Who will lead it, pay for it, and ensure its success? 

This is where the international response to the Arab Spring is extremely instructive and sobering. 

2. Now let’s turn to the Arab Spring (extracted from my talk to the San Diego World Affairs Council on 14 June)

There is much debate about what to call the chain of events that started in Tunisia in mid-December and spread rapidly in other Arab countries.   Commentators have called it many things including: a popular uprising; a revolution; citizens’ revolt; and even the Arab Tsunami.  I think many have settled for the term The Arab Spring mainlybecauseit conjures up inchoate and conflicting imagery: 

Spring signifies a natural process of change and renewal; it is full of promise, but it is also a passing season—the blossoms are here today and gone tomorrow.  There is no telling what a scorching summer might bring.    It is too early to say how long the Arab Spring will last and what type of summer will follow.

In a nutshell, the Arab Spring is the sudden, spontaneous and largely non-violent unleashing of widespread public rebellion against the long-despised, entrenched socio-economic and political regimes in the Arab region.   It is the popular quest for freedom & dignity that has lit up the tinderbox of corruption and repression in the Arab world.

For too long, the Arab world was caught in a time warp.  As other regions transitioned from dictatorship, communism, civil war and authoritarian regimes, the Arab world seemed to be stuck with an unsavory medley of anachronistic monarchies and the so-called “hereditary” republic.  Moammar Khaddafi came to power in 1969.  Ali Abdallah Saleh became President following a coup in 1978.  Bashar al Assaad inherited his position from his father 11 years ago.  Hafez al Assaad ruled Syria for 30 years from 1971 to 2000. 

Remarkably, roughly 60% of the population of the Arab world is below 25 years old.  They know no other rulers than the ones they and their parents have toiled under—without voice, without representation, without freedom, without due process, without basic rights—and with increasingly difficult socio-economic conditions:  poverty; youth bulge; high unemployment;  corruption; rural-urban migration;

Thus, a combination of crushing socio-economic conditions and the indignities of repressive and unresponsive political regimes gave rise to the Arab Spring.  Pressures were building up steadily in each country, but ultimately it was the popular response to a powerful human tragedy in Tunisia that set the stage for what transpired in rapid succession in other countries.  The desperate self-immolation of a young man and the following popular revolt in Tunisia broke the fear barrier that finally allowed people to take to the streets in large numbers.

It has been six months since the first spark was lit in Tunisia and it caught fire in other countries.  Too much has happened since then to allow a brief summary. However, let me quickly highlight what is special about the Arab spring:

1. Despite major differences in each country, the popular revolts all sprung from the same root:  concrete socio-economic grievances combined with pent-up demands for dignity, respect and freedom.
2. On the whole, the revolts have been non-violent, spontaneous and sustained.  With some exceptions (mainly Bahrain) the revolts have continued despite brutal reaction from ruling regimes.
3. Again, despite variations, the revolts have enjoyed widespread support—crossing religious, class, gender, ideological and other social divides—and they erupted in the absence of centralized leadership.  Importantly, youth and women have played a strong role—overcoming major cultural and social prohibitions. 
4. The youth’s effective deployment of social media has ushered in what is imaginatively called the Arab “liberation technology”—although it is erroneous to attribute the popular uprisings primarily to the role of modern technology. 
5. For obvious geo-strategic, political and economic reasons, the Arab world is one of the most externally penetrated regions in the world.  Yet, so far, the revolt in each country has been directed internally against the ruling regimes.  There has been little anti-imperialist, anti-Western, or anti-Israeli fervor. 
6. Curiously, so far, the revolts do not even have a strong Arab nationalist, pan-Arabist or pan-Islamist fervor. 
7. In short, then, the Arab Spring is not a singular or cohesive phenomenon.
8. It is, however, what some analysts call the Arab world’s 1848.  Indeed, like the Latin American Wars of Liberation in the early 1800s, the European wars of 1848-49, and the fall of the post-Soviet regimes at the end of the Cold War, the Arab Spring seems to be one of those rare historical events where a chain of political upheavals resonates and detonates others across an entire region.  
9. Nonetheless, it is essential to recognize that the sources and social dynamics of each revolt are different and, as a result, the challenges that lie ahead for each country remain unique.  

Due to time constraints, let’s quickly review only five countries: Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria and Yemen.

Despite huge differences in history, geography, and socio-economic conditions, these countries share the dubious honor of being republics—but in each case, repressive and autocratic republics. 

In these countries, we see two very different trajectories emerging.  In a nut-shell, Tunisia, Egypt and Syria are grappling primarily with the challenges of democratization while Libya and Yemen are also struggling with the challenge of un-finished state formation.   Unlike Egypt, Tunisia or Syria, neither Libya nor Yemen has a fully-formed or viable state.  They are essentially tribal societies under the guise of a centralized state.

Tunisia was not only the first country to kick-start the popular uprisings that caught rapid fire throughout the Arab world.  It is also the country where the ouster of President Ben Ali has opened the path to significant political reform.   The country faces serious challenges in terms of addressing the economic grievances of the rural population, the labor unions, and unemployed youth.  However, the most immediate demands are in terms of reforming a repressive political system that had been corrupted by Ben Ali, his extended family and patronage networks.  Yet, the government institutions and the military were largely shielded from the excesses of the Ben Ali regime and now provide the basis of stability once the constitutional and political problems are effectively addressed.

In Egypt, the democratization process faces greater difficulties not only because of Egypt’s deep demographic and economic problems.  Even with the ouster of President Mubarak, it is clear that the Mubarak regime is still in place since the Egyptian military has traditionally played and continues to play an important—albeit indirect-- role in the Egyptian political system.   After Mubarak’s departure, the military has taken active control of politics although it is clearly anxious to go back to its previous role.  Following a popular referendum last month, parliamentary elections are scheduled for the fall and presidential elections in early 2012.  In the meantime, a new constitution will be drafted.

At the moment, there is great uncertainty and high level of political activity to influence the outcome of these critical milestones.  In the meantime, there is continuing pressure to rebuild the country’s highly corroded public service—particularly the repressive public security services under the Minister of Interior. Concurrently, the population is in a continuous state of agitation with labor unions, government workers, students and other groups seeking to improve their economic conditions. Nonetheless, there are many hopeful and encouraging signs—including the composition of the new cabinet.   What happens in the hot summer months leading up to the elections in the fall will be critical for the future of the Egyptian Spring. 

Syria presents a very different situation than Egypt and Tunisia. The Asa’ad regime is a minority Alawite group ruling over a Sunni population through its control over the military, the security forces and the Baathist political organization.  When President Basher Asa’ad came to power eleven years ago, hopes were raised that he would initiative serious political reforms.  Whatever the President’s personal inclinations, however, the regime strongly resisted reform.   Given the military’s strength and the brutal way Hafez al Assad had put down previous uprisings, the chances of a popular revolt seemed quite remote in Syria.  However, the Arab Spring quickly galvanized Syrians in multiple cities, including Damascus.

In short, in Egypt, Tunisia and Syria—the challenge is to reform the political system so that it can begin to address the crushing socio-economic conditions that led to popular uprisings.

On the other hand, the Arab spring seems to have opened the door to armed conflict and civil war in Libya and Yemen.

Libya is once again the most erratic case as its long-time ruler has defied wide-spread popular resistance, strong international sanctions, and relentless NATO military action. There is no doubt that there is low-level civil war raging in Libya. Unlike in Tunisia and Egypt where the popular rebellions centered on the capital, in Libya a ragtag of rebels in the eastern provinces ignited the protests--revealing deep-rooted tribal and regional cleavages. Qaddafi’s personalized, capricious and repressive rule did not only conceal the deep divisions in Libyan society, it actually exacerbated them by retarding the development of national and civic institutions. 

It is likely that the Qaddafi regime will eventually fall.  But, what transpires after that is extremely difficult to judge.  It largely depends on how long the regime survives and how it collapses.

Undoubtedly, Yemen is the most enigmatic and complicated case.  It is a highly traditional tribal society.  It is also the least developed Arab country—surrounded by one of the richest, namely Saudi Arabia.  Yemen also has the historic distinction of having had the Arab world’s only Marxist regime in South Yemen.  Since the unification between North and South Yemen, however, the country has been wracked by multiple problems which were only exacerbated by the rise of terrorism.  Even before the outbreak of public protests against the regime of President Ali Abdallah Saleh earlier this year, Yemen faced several violent conflicts—including the Houti rebellion in the North, a secessionist movement in the South, terrorism and low-level tribal conflict in the hinterland and growing frustration with the Salah regime in Sana’a.  The popular revolt totally disrupted the precarious political balancing act that Saleh had perfected over 30 years.  With President Saleh temporarily out of commission in Saudi Arabia, it is difficult to predict how the various tribal leaders will manage the ongoing political unrest as well as various armed conflicts.

III. Differing International Responses

Let me focus on only the most obvious:  Intervention in Libya vs. non-intervention in Bahrain, Yemen, and Syria.

Libya all the starts were aligned for intervention: 

-Qaddafi and his son Seif publicly threatened to turn Libya into a blood bath; this placed a tremendous burden on the international community; no one wanted to be responsible for ANOTHER massacre or genocide.

- As a result, Security Council, Arab League, Org of African Unity—they all adopted resolutions calling on the international community to stop Moammar Qaddafi from unleashing his fury on his own people.

- Despite the vast amount of money he invested abroad, Qaddafi had few friends or supporters in the international community; his was always a very erratic regime

- The Libyan army (esp. the air force) was not a serious force to reckon with.

- Britain and France (who have strong economic interests in Libya and reasons to prevent a Libyan exodus to Europe) were united in their advocacy of intervention, and

So, the international community intervened under a relatively narrow UN Security Council resolution assuming that Qaddafi would be easily toppled…

Now let’s turn to the other cases—or at least Syria:

• Important—influential country with important friends (Russia, Iran, etc.)
• Stability of the Syrian regime very important for the region (Israel, Lebanon, etc.)
• Military is supportive of the regime and battle tested and strong
• The ruling elite is a minority and has much to lose
• Internationals not willing to intervene and get bogged down in Syria:  Too much at stake